Ashraf Marwan: Master spy for Israel or Egypt?

By Joe Spier

CALGARY, Alberta, Canada — The Yom Kippur war of 1973 was an Israeli military success to the extent that when the cease fire came into effect the Syrian invading army had been pushed back behind the 1967 armistice line and though Egyptian forces had established a beachhead on the Israeli held side of the Suez Canal, Israeli tanks and infantry were operating on the Egyptian side, trapping Egypt’s third army on the other side. Yet, the Arab offensive caught Israel with such surprise and so few troops at the fronts, putting her security, even survival at peril, that public anger and protest forced a Commission of Inquiry to be established which found that erroneous evaluation of intelligence was responsible.  The IDF Chief of Staff, the Commander of the Southern Front, the Military Intelligence Chief, and his Deputy Head of Research were all fired. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Prime Minister Golda Meir resigned

The disgraced Military Intelligence Chief, General Eli Zeira, in order to rehabilitate his name, claimed that a certain Mossad (National Intelligence Agency of Israel) spy, whom he asserted was in reality an Egyptian double agent, caused the failure of intelligence.  The Mossad investigated and not surprisingly concluded that one of their own was not a double agent. Zeira, not convinced, incredibly in 2002, leaked the name, Ashraf Marwan.

The story begins in 1969 when 26 year-old Egyptian, Ashraf Marwan, left Cairo for London to visit a doctor for treatment of a stomach ailment. The physician was a “sayan”, a Jewish volunteer who when asked assists Israeli agents. Marwan handed the doctor a file containing official Egyptian state documents and requested that they be delivered to the Israeli Embassy in London.

Three days later, the Mossad contacted Marwan while shopping at Harrods and thus began Marwan’s career as an Israeli spy who would meet Mossad agents in a London safe-house from time to time, deliver intelligence and receive 50,000 British pounds for each visit. Often meetings were held directly with Zvi Zamir, head of the Mossad. Marwan was his most valuable spy.

Prior to the first contact, the Mossad had been suspicious of Marwan, there always being the danger that a walk-in is a double agent, but after a careful vetting, the Mossad determined that the material was legitimate and that Marwan was a justifiable source. Marwan was no ordinary person. He was married to the daughter of the late Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser and he was a close confident, adviser and ambassador at large of President Anwar al-Sadat. Those credentials made Marwan risk worthy.

Between 1969 and 1973, Marwan, under the code name, “In-law” supplied Israel with a bonanza of information, Egyptian troop training and weaponry, war plans for recapturing the Sinai, records of arms deals, transcripts of meetings between Sadat and world leaders including Soviet Premier, Leonid Brezhnev; spectacular intelligence that proved to be reliable. His information was likened to having somebody “in the bed of the ruler.” Marwan’s reports were so valuable that rather than being abridged, the Mossad sent complete transcripts to Israel’s top military brass and political leaders. Marwan’s motivation was clearly financial but it was believed that in part it was also due to his hatred for the Soviet Union, then Egypt’s patron and chief arms supplier.

What Israel wanted most was information about Egypt’s war aims. This they received from Marwan. First Marwan told them what they already knew; that in light of Egypt’s humiliating and total defeat in the Six Day War, Sadat planned a future attack in order to recapture the Sinai. Then Marwan passed on what would later become known in Israel as the “konseptzia” (in English the “concept”), that Egypt would not go to war until it possessed Scud missiles and long-range bombers and the Arab states were a unified coalition. The ‘konseptzia” became part of Israeli prevailing military theory which led her into misreading the intelligence on the eve of the Yom Kippur War when Israel’s Military Intelligence Chief issued a “low probability of war” assessment while the signs were pointing the other way.

In April 1973, Marwan warned Israel that an Egyptian attack was imminent. Israel immediately called up tens of thousands of reservists. The state of alert lasted three months and cost about $35 million, a heavy and unexpected burden. This false alarm led to seeds of doubt when Marwan supplied the same information half a year later.

In the weeks and days preceding the Yom Kippur War, intelligence already existed predicting a surprise attack. In September, King Hussein of Jordan personally warned Prime Minister Golda Meir that Egypt and Syria were about to launch an assault. Two days before war broke out, the Israelis learned that the families of Russian advisers were hastily leaving Egypt. One day later a report came in that Egyptian troops were ordered to break their Ramadan fast. Syria carried out a large deployment of troops and weaponry along the Golan Front. Egypt built up its forces and conducted exercises along the Suez Canal. A junior intelligence officer assessed these deployments and exercises as preparation for a canal crossing and twice warned of an imminent attack but was ignored. Both the military and political establishments misread the signs and buoyed by the “konseptzia”, continued to believe in the low probability of war and in any event, in flawed confidence that they would get sufficient warning before any attack took place.

Meanwhile no one in Israel had heard from Ashraf Marwan. That is until October 5, when Marwan sent a flash message to his Mossad handler “D” using the word “radish,” code meaning “war” and requested a meeting with Zamir in London. The last El Al flight to London was held up for 30 minutes so that Zamir and D could board. The meeting took place on October 6, shortly after midnight, just hours before the surprise attack. Marwan advised Zamir that Egypt and Syria would attack Israel on two fronts that same day at sunset. Zamir immediately phoned Israel from London’s Israeli Embassy on an open line, there being no cipher clerks available because of the Yom Kippur holiday and he relayed the message.

At 4 o’clock in the morning the call was taken by General Zeira, Israel’s Military Intelligence Chief and by 5.50 A.M. Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan was briefed. Dayan decided to bring the matter of mobilization of the reserves to Prime Minister, Golda Meir for decision. The Israeli army is based on a 20% active force and an 80% reserve force. At 8.00 in the morning, senior members of the army and of Meir’s cabinet met and agreed that a general mobilization would not be ordered at that time. A pre-emptive strike was also vetoed. At midday, a full cabinet briefing took place and at 1.55 P.M., in the midst of the discussion for general mobilization approval, Meir’s military secretary opened the door to the meeting room and announced, “The news is that war has begun”. The attack came four hours before the time Marwan stated that it would. Israel was woefully unprepared.

While Marwan’s information, if acted upon, would have given Israel sufficient time to reinforce the Syrian front, it would not have been in sufficient time to bolster the Egyptian front. The Egyptian- Syrian surprise was tempered by a strategic error. By commencing the attack on Yom Kippur it was easy for Israel to call up her reserves, they were mostly in Synagogue and as the roads were empty, the reserves were able to rapidly deploy to the fronts.

After the Yom Kippur war, President Sadat secretly awarded Marwan, Egypt’s highest medal for his role in the war. Hosni Mubarek, Egypt’s current president, has confirmed that Marwan “carried out patriotic acts which it is not time yet to reveal”.

Following President Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Marwan moved to London, made a fortune selling arms, owned several luxury hotels and had shares in the Chelsea soccer club.

Those who are convinced that Marwan was a legitimate Israeli spy argue that he supplied Israel with a ream of important Egyptian documents, a treasure trove of intelligence obtained from the highest government levels; that he did warn Israel of the imminent joint Egyptian-Syrian offensive; that if he really was a double-agent he would not have given any warning.

Those who are convinced that Marwan was an Egyptian double agent agree that Marwan’s information was valuable and accurate but only because when it came time to tell the “big lie” he would be believed. They argue that Marwan was responsible for the misinformation that led Israel to adopt the erroneous “konseptzia” theory; that the false warning in April 1973 was a “cry wolf” ploy; that his warning of the Yom Kippur surprise attack came too late to reinforce the Egyptian front; that he misinformed the time of the offensive by four critical hours to lull the Israelis into thinking they had more time than they did.

So was Marwan an Israeli spy or an Egyptian double agent? The answer is locked away in a secure filing cabinet somewhere. The final truth is yet, if ever, to be revealed.

On June 27, 2007 Ashraf Marwan’s body was found on the sidewalk, five floors beneath the balcony of his central London flat, dead from an accidental fall…….or from a push by Egypt’s Mukhabarat……. or by Israel’s Mossad. The memoirs he had almost completed mysteriously disappeared.

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Spier is a retired lawyer with a keen interest in Jewish history.  You may contact him via joe.spier@sdjewishworld.com