By Barry Rubin
Syrian Authorities Break Up Protest, Maintain Full Control
HERZLIYA, Israel — Why are moderate Arab regimes–even if dictatorships–shaken by protest while hardline ones aren’t? Because at the least sign of trouble the radical governments crack down. Knowing that punishment will be harsh and that the West won’t be interested few dare to do anything.
And so in Damascus a silent vigil in support of the Egyptian protesters was quickly broken up. One attacker snarled, “[Bashar al] Assad is your president, and if you don’t like it in Syria, you should move to Egypt.” Demonstrators were told they were Israeli agents committing treason.
According to a source, there were 200 demonstrators and 1000 police and security personnel. One Syrian said sadly, “Why are the revolutions taking place in Tunisia and Egypt instead of here?”
That question, of course, cannot be answered definitively but aside from repression and belief that the government is strong (young Bashar, not old Husni), there are social factors. The regime has a built-in backing from the Alawites who form much of the ruling class. Though this is a controversial issue, my view is that Alawites are not really Muslims. They would not fair well in an Islamist revolution. The large Christian community looks at the regime as its protector from persecution by Islamists.
The largest segment of the population, Sunni Muslims, have been bought off by the regime’s militant demagoguery, hatred of Israel, and support for Sunni Muslim Islamists abroad. In short, whether or not the old Arab nationalist methods work in Egypt, they certainly still work in Syria.
One target of the protest was corruption, for example the fact that communications companies entirely controlled by Rami Makhlouf, President Assad’s cousin, charge sky-high prices.
How much attention will the U.S. government give to events in Syria? Might it call for Bashar to resign and threaten to end its “engagement” with Syria if he doesn’t leave or grant more rights? Of course not. In fact a U.S. ambassador has just arrived, an action that the Syrian regime sees as a concession, and Syria is generally flattered in the Western media.
Any wonder why America’s enemies multiply in number while its friends shrink?
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Briefly, What Could the U.S. Government Have Done in Egypt?
I’m not judging right now between these alternatives but want to make clear that many alternatives did exist.
1. The U.S. government could have waited to assess the situation rather than leap in immediately. Avoiding involvement altogether was a serious option, retaining the option to act if the conflict went on a long time or seemed to spiral toward civil war. During many previous cases of internal unrest in allied Arab states–though, of course, this was larger–the United States has not previously intervened without being asked to do so. And in cases where hostile states used massive repression, it remained passive.
2. It could have expressed support for the Mubarak government while urging it to ease conditions. Private pressure in the context of support would have been more effective. The easing of repression, economic benefits, and other steps to ensure fair elections might have been taken with U.S. encouragement. Working with members of the leadership to ensure the retirement of an 82-year-old president is more likely to succeed than threatening the position of all regime officials causing them to circle the wagons and hang tough.
3. By staying “neutral” the U.S. government could have given the Mubarak government an incentive to be flexible since it would hope to retain, perhaps even increase, U.S. support. This approach could also have made the opposition more cautious since it wanted to gain U.S. support and felt that it had less leverage.
4. But by choosing the side of the opposition publicly, it threw away its leverage. Why should the Egyptian government listen to it and why should the opposition stop short of total victory? When Mubarak said that Obama does not understand Egyptian culture, in part he meant that by taking sides the U.S. government further enflamed the crisis. One could argue that the revolt would have inevitably triumphed (though the word “inevitably” is usually a mistake in such circumstances) but as long as Mubarak has support of the army there is no way the opposition could win.
5. By publicly treating the Egyptian government in an insulting way, the U.S. government sent bad signals to every ally. They could only conclude that not only might Washington treat them the same way but that it was not a reliable protector against enemies foreign and domestic.
6. By unilaterally saying it would accept the Muslim Brotherhood in government–on the basis of very flimsy and unenforcable conditions–the U.S. government raised the status of the Brotherhood and, again, threw away leverage. It could have simply remained silent.
7. By expressing excessive optimism that everything would be all right, that threats were low or nonexistent, that the Brotherhood was not dangerous, and so on, the government misled public opinion and lulled itself into a false sense of security. It was then caught by surprise as Mubarak rejected Obama’s “orders.”
I’d be happy to add more or refine these points based on readers’ suggestions. I have also prepared a longer, more detailed article on this subject to publish soon.
Scoop: Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Explains How It Will Get Rid of Peace Treaty with Israel
We have been repeatedly assured in the media–on the basis of no evidence–that if the Muslim Brotherhood comes to power in a coalition or even directly that the radical Islamist group would keep the peace treaty with Israel.
On Russian television, one Brotherhood leader, Rashad al-Bayoumi, said that when they came to power they will abolish the treaty altogether.
Another, former spokesman Doctor Kamel Helbaoui, explains one way they might get out of it. It is also a good example of how they avoid embarassing questions, and usually get away with it. Clearly, Brotherhood leaders have been warned to avoid extremist statements as it tries to sell itself to the Western audience and (insert adjective) media as moderate and cuddly.
In an interview on French television, he says (1:40-2:12 on the show):
Interviewer: “And would you revoke the peace treaty with Israel?”
Answer: “We respect all protocols and the treaties built on justice.
Interviewer: “Sorry, I didn’t understand your response.”
Answer: “We respect every treaty and every protocol for peace, but it should be built on justice.
Interviewer: “Does that mean you would keep the peace treaty with Israel?
Answer: “You keep it, but you have to review it in [unclear] of the atrocities from either side.”
Interviewer: “What do you mean by that?”
Answer: “I mean that we don’t need injustice to reach the people. If the peace treaty does not give the people their rights, it is not a good treaty, is not a good peace accord.”
Interviewer: “So are you saying that the current peace treaty is not good enough?”
Answer: “No, it is not good enough. I must say that.”
Interviewer: “So you would revoke that peace treaty.
Answer: “No, I didn’t say that.
Interviewer: You would change it?
Answer: It could be reviewed in view of respect of human rights. And through the United Nations, through freedom given to the people, respect of every one. Not occupation and the military atrocities against civilians.”
So while trying to avoid admitting it, he explains that Egypt would demand changes and not accept the existing treaty. But what you also have to know–and most journalists would miss–is that the Muslim Brotherhood regards Israel’s existence as “occupation” and the denial of Muslim rights.
Paradoxically, then, the only way Israel could have a peace treaty with Egypt is not to exist at all.
Other Brotherhood spokesmen have said that if the group comes to power there will be a referendum on the treaty, and of course it will be rejected. This has been said many times in Arabic though the Western media seem completely unaware of it, as with many other things about the Brotherhood.
You have to understand the bizarre situation here. Every speech in Arabic of Brotherhood leaders and cadre and articles in their publications are full of anti-Jewish hatred, anti-American hatred, and support for violence. Yet in the Western media all of this simply is never mentioned, in part because reporters take the group’s word on its credentials.
In other words, the Brotherhood will end the peace with Israel and return to a state of war.
This would not necessarily mean going to war, since Egypt’s army might well be unwilling to do so, considering the consequences and not liking the Brotherhood. In contrast, though, it is easy to make Egypt into a safe haven from which terrorists could attack across the border and any weapons Hamas wanted would come from Egyptian arsenals (or if the army blocked that, just be freely imported into the Gaza Strip.
Eventually, this would lead to renewed war between Israel and Hamas, or even Israel and Egypt, in which thousands of people would die. Some would call that speculation. I would prefer that they didn’t get to see it proven to be accurate.
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Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal. The GLORIA Center’s site is http://www.gloria-center.org